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WORK SANCTIONS UNDER WELFARE REFORM: ARE THEY HELPING
WOMEN ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY?
VICKI LENS*
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act
1
2
(PRWORA) of 1996 radically reshaped the landscape of welfare for women.
The changes transformed a program designed to meet the material needs of
poor women and their families into one primarily focused on preventing
dependency through promoting work.
PRWORA includes an array of
behavioral-based reforms that mandate work and penalize its absence. One of
the key tools for enforcing the work mandate is sanctions, which can include
financial penalties. Women who do not comply with work rules can lose all or
some of their cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid.
Whether sanctions help women achieve self-sufficiency in the labor market
is a subject of scholarly debate. Central to this discussion is how sanctions are
being used on the front-lines of welfare, and how recipients are responding to
them. This article reports the findings of the author’s empirical study of the
sanctioning process in two regions in Texas: one primarily rural and the other
urban/suburban. It examines how and when sanctions are imposed by local
staff in welfare offices and what problems recipients encounter when they
attempt to comply with the work rules and avoid sanctions. Using this and
other empirical studies on sanctions, this article examines whether sanctions are
helping poor women achieve self-sufficiency.
Part I of this article discusses the history of work rules in public assistance
programs. Part II examines the use of sanctions in welfare-to-work programs,
drawing extensively on the empirical literature describing the rates of sanction,
the characteristics of sanctioned families, and whether sanctions induce
hardship. Part III reports on the results of the study. Part IV evaluates whether
sanctions are an appropriate tool for addressing the problem of poverty and
welfare dependency among poor women and their families.

* Assistant Professor at the Columbia University School of Social Work; J.D., New York Law
School, PhD in Social Welfare, Yeshiva University.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
2. Although men are also eligible for assistance, PRWORA especially affects women because
they account for 90% of adults receiving public assistance. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF TANF
RECIPIENTS FISCAL YEAR 2001, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/
FY2001/characteristics.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). Therefore, the word “women” is used
interchangeably with “recipients” throughout this article.
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I. HISTORY OF WORK RULES
3

In the seventy years since the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program
was enacted, it has evolved from a program designed to keep mothers out of the
workforce to a program requiring their participation. This shift mirrors today’s
4
greater acceptance of women’s participation in the market economy. But the
amendments to ADC also reflect changing notions of who is deserving of
government aid and what recipients must do to obtain it.
Passed during the upheaval of the Great Depression, ADC was one of
many programs that signaled a new role for the federal government in funding
and administering social welfare programs. Modeled on state Mothers’ Pension
Programs, it provided aid to children who had lost a parent due to death or
5
physical or mental incapacity. The primary beneficiaries were white widows.
African-American women, the divorced and the never married were routinely
denied benefits through state suitable home provisions that required officials to
6
determine a home’s fitness before aid was granted. However, although white
widows were deemed worthy of aid, their worth was measured as being less
than that of every other needy group. In fact, ADC was the least generous of the
7
programs enacted in response to the Great Depression.
The New Deal also codified into law a gender distinction that
disadvantaged women. A two-tiered system was created where paid workers,
who were primarily men, received social insurance benefits, while poor women
received means-tested welfare. Thus, while ADC exempted women from work,
the lack of a connection to the labor market marked them as less worthy of
receiving social welfare. As Bussierre describes it, “men were treated as rights8
bearing citizens, ADC recipients as subjects to be molded into ‘good’ mothers.”
Starting in the 1960s, attempts were made to also mold these “good
mothers” into good workers. Work requirements were introduced for the first
9
time in 1967 by the enactment of the Work Incentive Program (WIN). Welfare
departments were required to refer employable recipients, defined as those
without preschool children, to state labor departments, and offer a range of

3. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.). For a comprehensive discussion of the origins of the ADC program, see MIMI
ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN (rev. ed. 1996); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW
OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1997); THEDA SKOCPOL,
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1995). The original program only provided aid for children.
A mother’s grant was added in 1950 and the program’s name was changed to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962. ABRAMOVITZ, supra, at 316.
4. See Rebecca M. Blank & Lucie Schmidt, Work, Wages and Welfare, in THE NEW WORLD OF
WELFARE 70, 72 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001). From 1969 to 1999 the percentage of
women in the labor force increased from 48.6% to 72.2%. Id.
5. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 3, at 319.
6. See id. In 1939, only 25% of ADC mothers were divorced, separated, or abandoned by their
husbands, while 61% were widowed. Id.
7. Id. at 317.
8. ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 75 (1997).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-645 (2000), repealed by Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102
Stat. 2377.
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services, including child care, transportation and training to facilitate work.
The program lasted until 1989 and accomplished little because of limited
funding. Only about two percent of the eligible welfare population obtained
11
jobs through the program. Many recipients of what was by then known as Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) were exempted, and those who
12
did participate, often did little more than register for the program.
The 1980s brought more serious attempts to move recipients from welfare
to work. Programs such as those established by the Job Training Partnership
Act of 1982 provided a wide range of services including counseling, education
and job search assistance to the economically disadvantaged, including welfare
13
recipients.
States were also encouraged by the federal government to
14
experiment with more intensive welfare-to-work programs. Under a federal
waiver program, states were permitted to deviate from WIN rules and use more
15
coercive approaches including mandatory work and full-family sanctions. The
states responded with a range of voluntary and involuntary programs offering
such services as child care and transportation and training and education. Some
16
programs fared better than others. However, overall, they did little to lift poor
women out of poverty, because the only jobs they were often suited for were
17
unskilled and, hence, low-paying.
These welfare-to-work programs served as a model for the next major
program, which was the most radical reform of the welfare system before
18
PRWORA. The Family Support Act of 1988 made work its centerpiece, and
unlike past programs, made it mandatory for more recipients. While carrots
such as education, training and support services were offered, those clients who
refused to participate in the newly created Jobs Opportunity and Basic Skills
19
Program (JOBS) risked the partial loss of their grant. Unlike the WIN program,
mothers with preschool children (over the age of three) were required to
10. For a discussion of the WIN program, see MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE
REALTIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 20-21 (1994); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 382-383 (1993).
11. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 10, at 3.
12. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 3, at 341.
13. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 10, at 386.
14. BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 21-22.
15. The waiver programs (referred to as “section 1115 waivers” for the section in the Social
Security Act under which they were granted) permitted states to experiment with work rules, time
limits and sanctions. By 1996, forty-six states had been granted waivers of federal requirements. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES WITH BENEFIT
TERMINATION 3 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97074.pdf [hereinafter
STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES].
16. The most effective waiver program was the Greater Avenue to Independence Program
(GAIN) in Riverside County, California. Compared to a control group, participants increased their
earnings by $1000 and their probability of employment by 9%. Blank & Schmidt supra note 4, at 93.
For a summary of the research on these waiver programs, see JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD
PAULEY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK (1991).
17. For a critique of the overall impact of the programs the states created, see PIVEN &
CLOWARD, supra note 10, at 387-389; BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 21-23.
18. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343-2428 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
19. See id.
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20

By reaching further into the pool of mothers and threatening
participate.
sanctions for nonparticipation, JOBS signaled a turning point in welfare. Poor
women’s work behavior, and not their need or mothering responsibilities,
became the focus. The coercive and punitive aspects of the law also made it
clear that the women’s work behavior was suspect. However, like the WIN
program before it, JOBS had meager results because of a lack of resources and
21
minimal participation from the welfare population.
The transformation of the welfare system into a work system was
22
completed with the passage of PRWORA in 1996. The law imposes a lifetime
five-year limit on assistance and escalates both mandatory work participation
23
rates and the use of sanctions. States are required to ensure that a substantial
portion of their welfare population is participating in work activities for a
prescribed number of hours each week. States are also permitted to impose
24
either full or partial sanctions for noncompliance with work rules. States have
the option of exempting parents from the work requirement for the first twelve
25
months of their children’s lives. While the goal of the law is self-sufficiency for
recipients, it has a very limited view of what route recipients should take to
obtain it. Education and training are severely limited; thus, recipients are
26
required to enter the labor market immediately and take any available job.
PRWORA has also changed welfare delivery systems. Federal funding was
changed to a block grant and states were left free to devise their own programs
27
within the framework of work rules and time limits described by the act. The
result has been a decrease in spending on cash assistance and an increase in
spending on a variety of programs and services, including child care,
28
employment and training, and innovative diversion programs.
Service

20. Id.
21. According to BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 25, only 16% of nonexempt recipients
participated in 1992, because a lack of funds and a recession prevented the states from doing more
under the program.
22. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
23. Id.
24. As of 2002, states were required by 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1)(2000) to ensure that 50% of their
welfare population is participating in work programs. Clients are required to work a minimum of
thirty hours per week. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A) (2000). Federal law requires states to impose partial
sanctions for violations of work rules and grants states the option to increase and extend sanctions,
including imposing full-family sanctions. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(5) (2000).
26. Vocational education is allowed only for one year and for only 30% of families. 42 U.S.C. §
607(c)(2)(D)-(d)(8) (2000). Work activities include job search, unsubsidized employment, community
service, and on-the-job training. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(2)(D) (2000). This approach is commonly referred
to as “work first.” For a discussion of the various ways in which states have implemented “work
first,” see Thomas L. Gais et al., Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, in THE NEW
WORLD OF WELFARE 35, 52-59 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).
28. Gais et al., supra note 26, at 50-51. Child care especially received a boon from welfare
reform. The law created the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) which consolidated and
increased the funding of existing child care programs. States also used TANF monies to fund
directly child care services. The result was a 60% increase in funding for child care between 1994
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delivery was also reconfigured around the work requirements. Many local
welfare offices have become “job centers.” Others have forged relationships
with outside providers, including state employment offices, nonprofit and even
29
for-profit agencies, to provide welfare-to-work services. Thus, while work is
mandated, it is also supported through an array of services, including child care,
transportation assistance, work incentives and other initiatives designed to help
30
women obtain and retain employment.
In sum, today’s current welfare system stands at a polar opposite from its
historical roots. The worthy white widow of the past has been replaced by the
unworthy single mother of the present. Staying at home to care for children is
no longer the preferred option, or even a choice. Work is not just supported, but
compelled: the failure to work is now a sanctionable offense punishable by a loss
of all or part of a family’s grant.
II. SANCTIONS
A. The Structure and Design of Sanctions
PRWORA elevated sanctions from the sidelines of welfare, where they
were sparingly employed, to a central and defining role. The law requires states
to impose partial sanctions for violations of work rules, and gives states the
option to increase and extend sanctions, including imposing full-family
31
sanctions. All states but three (Arkansas, Rhode Island, and Washington) have
sanctions that are harsher than the minimum required by federal law, although
32
their structure and stringency vary. Seventeen states impose an immediate
full-family sanction when a recipient fails to comply with the work rules, which
33
means that the entire family is cut off from aid. Another eighteen states impose

and 1999. Douglas J. Besharov with Nazanin Samari, Child Care after Welfare Reform, in THE NEW
WORLD OF WELFARE 461, 462-63. (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001).
29. For a discussion of these various new service delivery systems, see KARIN MARTINSON &
PAMELA A. HOLCOMB, THE URBAN INST., REFORMING WELFARE: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
CHALLENGES (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310535.
30. The block grant funding permitted states to spend federal funds for new types of benefits
and services. The sharp decline in caseloads after welfare reform also left the states with surplus
TANF funds to spend on new programs and services. The states responded with often innovative
projects designed to help women achieve self-sufficiency. Gais et al., supra note, 26, at 48-52.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2000). States are also required to impose sanctions for a recipient’s failure
to comply with child support obligations without good cause by imposing not less than a 25%
reduction of the grant, with the option of imposing a full-family sanction. 42 U.S.C. § 608 (a)(2)
(2000). States can also impose sanctions for a failure to ensure that children attend school, failure to
work toward a high school diploma or equivalent, failure to comply with individual responsibility
plans, and for testing positive for controlled substances. 42 U.S.C. § 604(i)-(j) (2000); 42 U.S.C.
§608(b) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2000). However, the most commonly sanctioned conduct is
violation of the work rules. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2000).
32. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATE SANCTION POLICIES AND NUMBER
OF FAMILIES AFFECTED 14, 16-17 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00044.pdf
[hereinafter STATE SANCTION POLICIES].
33. LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., REVIEW OF SANCTION
POLICIES AND RESEARCH STUDIES 2 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/TANF-Sanctions03/
[hereinafter REVIEW OF SANCTION POLICIES].
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a gradual full-family sanction: for the first failure to comply, only the violator’s
portion of the grant is eliminated, but subsequent violations result in a total loss
34
of the grant. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia impose a partial
35
sanction: only the noncompliant adult’s portion of the grant is eliminated. The
minimum duration of sanctions also varies among the states. In most states,
immediate compliance will stop the sanction the first time the work rules are
36
violated.
Subsequent violations result in longer sanctions, often up to six
37
months; in seven states, they result in a lifetime termination of benefits.
Sanctions can also result in more than a partial or full loss of cash
assistance. States also have the option to terminate Medicaid benefits for
38
nonpregnant adults who have violated the work rules, and terminate food
stamp benefits for the entire family if all the children in the household are over
39
six years of age.
In all states, clients can avoid a sanction by showing that they had “good
40
cause” for not complying with a work rule. Federal law prohibits sanctioning
clients who do not comply because they were unable to obtain child care for a
41
child under six, but otherwise does not define good cause. The states have
adopted various criteria, some more specific than others. Ill health, a family
crisis, childcare difficulties, or lack of transportation are some examples of good
42
cause.
B. Rates of Sanctioning
Measuring sanctioning rates has proved difficult for methodological
reasons and because states and counties within the same state vary widely in
how often they sanction. A study conducted by the U.S. General Accounting
Office in 1998 reported that in an average month, only five percent of the total
43
TANF caseload in the country is in sanction status. However, this study only
counted sanctions during the first month they are imposed, even though

34. Id. One state, Wisconsin, has a pay-for-performance sanction which reduces the grant by
the amount of required hours not worked. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 2. The fourteen states are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Indiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and
Washington. Id. at app. A.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 3-4. The states that apply lifetime termination of benefits for repeated noncompliance
are: Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Id. at app. B.
38. Thirteen states have chosen this option. They are: Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, and
Wyoming. Id. at app. C-1.
39. Fifteen states have chosen to do so. They are: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia. Id. at app. C-1.
40. See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, SANCTIONS: ‘GOOD CAUSE’ FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE AS OF APRIL 2000 (2001), available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/sanctions/
goodcause1.PDF & http://www.spdp.org/tanf/sanctions/goodcause2.PDF.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (e)(2) (2000).
42. STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, supra note 40.
43. STATE SANCTION POLICIES, supra note 32, at 5.
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44

Other studies that have followed
sanctions can last for several months.
recipients over time have found much higher sanction rates, although still a
great variation in sanction rates. For example, studies in Delaware and Indiana
45
found sanction rates of approximately fifty percent, while another study in
46
South Carolina found a much lower sanction rate of nineteen percent. Sanction
rates can also increase over time within a specific state. The Delaware study
found sanction rates had more than doubled from eight percent to eighteen
47
percent in a one-year period.
Thus, sanction rates can be very fluid: they vary over time, as well as from
state to state, and within states. However, they are an integral part of each
state’s welfare system under PRWORA.
C. Characteristics of Sanctioned Families
While sanction rates vary across states, throughout the nation the
characteristics of sanctioned families remain remarkably constant. Studies from
multiple states consistently show that sanctioned recipients are more
disadvantaged and suffer from more serious barriers to employment than other
recipients. Virtually every study has found that sanctioned clients have either
lower levels of education or are less likely to have graduated from high school
48
49
or both. Sanctioned clients also have less work experience, and have spent

44.
45.

REVIEW OF SANCTION POLICIES, supra note 33, at 9.
DAVID J. FEIN & WANG S. LEE, ABT ASSOC. INC., THE ABC EVALUATION: CARRYING AND
USING THE STICK: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS IN DELAWARE’S A BETTER CHANCE PROGRAM 8 (1999),
available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/Sanfin3.pdf (finding a 52% sanction rate in
Delaware for work-related sanctions among early enrollees of the program); see also Pamela
Holcomb & Caroline Ratcliffe, When Welfare Recipients Fail to Comply with Work Requirements:
Indiana’s Experience with Partial Benefit Sanctions, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. SCI. 1, 4 (2000) (finding a 45%
sanction rate in Indiana for work-related sanctions).
46. ROBIN KORALEK, THE URBAN INST., SOUTH CAROLINA FAMILY INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM
PROCESS EVALUATION, TOPICAL REPORT: CONCILIATION AND SANCTIONING 8 (2000), available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410011.
47. FEIN & LEE, supra note 45, at 8.
48. Id. at 18 (finding that sanctioned individuals in Delaware were more likely than
nonsanctioned individuals to have less education); KORALEK, supra note 46, at 12 (finding in South
Carolina that sanctioned individuals are more likely to have less than a high school education);
DAVID MANCUSO & VANESSA L. LINDLER, THE SPHERE INST., EXAMINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
WELFARE LEAVERS AND SANCTIONED FAMILIES IN SONOMA COUNTY, FINAL REPORT 5 (2001), available
at http://www.sphereinstitute.org/publications/HewlettSonomaFinal.pdf (finding that sanctioned
individuals in California were less likely to have a high school diploma); LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL.,
MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS IN ILLINOIS,
NEW JERSEY AND SOUTH CAROLINA 33 (2004), available at http://mathematicampr.com/publications/pdfs/tanf3state.pdf [hereinafter THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED
SANCTIONS] (finding that sanctioned families in Illinois and New Jersey have less education than
nonsanctioned individuals); KAREN WESTRA & JOHN ROUTLEY, ARIZ. DEP’T OF ECON. SEC., ARIZONA
CASH ASSISTANCE EXIT STUDY: FIRST QUARTER 1998 COHORT (2000), available at
http://www.de.state.az.us/links/reports/exitstudy.html (finding that in Arizona 45% of sanctioned
individuals had completed high school as compared to 54% of nonsanctioned individuals); CHIFANG WU ET AL., UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, HOW DO WELFARE
SANCTIONS
WORK?
17
(2004),
available
at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/
publications/dps/pdfs/dp128204.pdf (finding that sanctioned recipients in Wisconsin are more
likely to have less education than nonsanctioned recipients); Andrew Cherlin et al., Operating within
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50

longer periods of time on public assistance. As compared to nonsanctioned
51
52
clients, they are younger, have more children, and are more likely to have
53
never married. Numerous studies in such diverse states as South Carolina,
Michigan, and Arizona to name just a few, have found that women of color are
54
more likely to be sanctioned than white mothers.
Sanctioned clients are also more likely to experience problems that may
interfere with employment. They or other household members are more likely
55
to have health problems, including alcohol and drug problems, and to

the Rules: Welfare Recipients’ Experiences with Sanctions and Case Closings, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 387, 399
(2002) (finding that sanctioned clients in Boston, Chicago and San Antonio are less likely to have a
high school degree); Marilyn Edelhoch et al., S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., The Post-Welfare Progress of
Sanctioned Clients in South Carolina, 24 J. APPL. SOC. SCI. 55, 58, 60 (2000) (finding that in South
Carolina those with the lowest educational attainment were twice as likely to be sanctioned as the
group with the highest educational attainment); Yeheskel Hasenfeld et al., The Logic of Sanctioning
Welfare Recipients: An Empirical Assessment, 78 SOC. SERV. REV. 304, 311 (2004) (finding that sanctioned
recipients in California are less educated than nonsanctioned recipients); Ariel Kalil et al., Sanctions
and Material Hardship under TANF, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 642, 654 (2002), (finding that women in
Michigan with low education are more than twice as likely to be sanctioned). But see Taryn
Lindhorst et al., Is Welfare Reform Working? A Study of the Effects of Sanctions on Families Receiving
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 27 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 185, 195 (2000) (finding no
significant difference in educational levels between sanctioned individuals and nonsanctioned
individuals in a southern urban area).
49. CATHERINE BORN ET AL., UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF SOC. WORK, LIFE AFTER WELFARE: A LOOK AT
SANCTIONED FAMILIES 24 (1999), available at http://www.familywelfare.umaryland.edu/reports/
ffsanctions.pdf (finding that fewer sanctioned clients in Maryland had wage histories); THE USE OF
TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48, at 35; WU ET AL., supra note 48, at 17; see also
Hasenfeld et al., supra note 48, at 311.
50. MANCUSO & LINDLER, supra note 48, at 10; WU ET AL., supra note 48, at 17; Edelhoch et al.,
supra note 48, at 58, 61, 63.
51. BORN ET AL., supra note 49, at 22; FEIN & LEE, supra note 45, at 21; KORALEK, supra note 46, at
12; THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48, at 33; Cherlin et al., supra note 48,
at 399; Hasenfeld et al., supra note 48, at 311; Kalil et al., supra note 48, at 655.52.,
MANCUSO
&
LINDLER, supra note 48, at 9; Cherlin et al., supra note 48, at 399; Edelhoch et al., supra note 48, at 12;
Hasenfeld et al., supra note 48, at 311.
53. KORALEK, supra note 46, at 12; THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48,
at 33; WESTRA & ROUTLEY, supra note 48, at 10.
54. FEIN & LEE, supra note 45, at 21 (finding sanctions were more common among nonwhites);
KORALEK, supra note 46, at 12 (finding blacks in South Carolina were more likely to be sanctioned);
THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48, at 33 (finding higher sanction rates for
blacks in Illinois and New Jersey); WESTRA & ROUTLEY, supra note 48, at 11 (finding a slightly higher
percentage of blacks and Hispanics were sanctioned while only 22% of whites were sanctioned); WU
ET AL., supra note 48, at 18 (finding sanctions more likely for women of color in Wisconsin); Cherlin
et al., supra note 48, at 399 (finding blacks were more likely to have their grants reduced or
discontinued in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio); Edelhoch et al., supra note 48, at 58 (finding that
31% of blacks in South Carolina were sanctioned); Kalil et al, supra note 48, at 655 (finding blacks in
Michigan were twice as likely to be sanctioned as whites in Michigan).
55. THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48, at 36 (finding sanctioned
clients were more likely to have health and physical problems); MANCUSO & LINDLER, supra note 48,
at 59 (finding sanctioned clients were more likely to report symptoms of depression); DENISE POLIT
ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., THE HEALTH OF POOR URBAN WOMEN:
FINDINGS FROM THE PROJECT ON DEVOLUTION AND URBAN CHANGE, ES-16 (2001), available at
http://www.mdrc.org/Reports2001/UC-HealthReport/UC-HealthRpt-FullRpt2001.pdf
(finding
that women in Cleveland, Los Angeles, Miami, and Philadelphia with multiple health problems,
including depression, were more likely to be sanctioned); Cherlin et al., supra note 48, at 399 (finding
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56

experience domestic violence. Logistical problems, such as difficulty securing
57
transportation or child care, are also more common among sanctioned clients.
In sum, while virtually all welfare recipients are disadvantaged, sanctioned
clients are the most disadvantaged.
D. Consequences of Sanctions
Not surprisingly, given the circumstances and characteristics of sanctioned
families, sanctions can cause severe hardship. In states that impose full-family
sanctions, families lose all of their benefits, while in states that impose partial
family sanctions, families lose a substantial portion of their benefits. Since
public assistance benefits are already very low and have not been increased or
adjusted for inflation, even a partial loss of benefits can have serious
58
consequences.
These consequences include material hardships. Sanctioned families are at
59
an increased risk of hunger and food insecurity.
Housing conditions can
deteriorate, as sanctioned families run an increased risk of homelessness,
60
61
eviction, and utility shut-offs. Medical needs can go unmet. Children are
particularly vulnerable. One study found that young children in sanctioned
families were at an increased risk for food insecurity and hospitalizations as

that sanctioned clients were more likely to report using marijuana within the last year, although they
did not report higher rates of hard drug use); Kalil et al., supra note 48, at 655 (finding that
sanctioned clients were more likely to have mental health problems).
56. MANCUSO & LINDLER, supra note 48, at 58 (finding sanctioned respondents were more likely
to report being the victim of a physical act of domestic violence in the previous six months); POLIT ET
AL., supra note 55, at ES-16 (finding women who reported being physically abused were more likely
to be sanctioned); Kalil et al., supra note 48, at 652 (finding sanctioned clients were more likely to
have experienced domestic violence within the last year).
57. JUNE GIBBS BROWN, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES: IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF CLIENT SANCTIONS 13 (1999),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-98-00290.pdf (finding that transportation was one
of the biggest barriers facing clients, especially in rural areas with limited job opportunities);
MANCUSO & LINDLER, supra note 48, at 27-28 (finding that sanctioned clients were less likely to have
a car and more likely to have transportation problems than nonsanctioned clients); Hasenfeld et al.,
supra note 48, at 312 (finding that transportation was even more of a barrier to clients than were
health problems); THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48, at 36 (finding that
families that experienced one or more personal, family, or logistical challenge, including child care,
were more likely to be sanctioned); Cherlin et al., supra note 48, at 399 (finding that sanctioned clients
were less likely to have a working phone or car); Kalil et al., supra note 48, at 652 (finding that
sanctioned clients were less likely to have a car or driver’s license than were nonsanctioned clients).
58. The median TANF benefit in 2000 was $381. This amounts to eighteen dollars less than the
$399 benefit available in 1996 when welfare reform was first enacted. Blank & Schmidt, supra note 4,
at 81. For a family of three, the financial cost of sanctions has been estimated to range from less than
$100 to over $400. THE USE OF TANF WORK-ORIENTED SANCTIONS, supra note 48, at 8.
59. Nancy E. Reichman et al., TANF Sanctioning and Hardship, 79 SOC. SERV. REV. 215, 223 (2005);
Lindhorst et al., supra note 48, at 195.
60. Lindhorst et al., supra note 48, at 196; Reichman et al., supra note 59, at 223; see also Kalil et
al., supra note 48, at 652 (finding sanctioned clients two and one-half times more likely to have a
utility shut off).
61. Lindhorst et al., supra note 48, at 195.
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compared to children in nonsanctioned families. Since sanctioned families are
cut off from their only means of support, they must seek alternative and often
less stable means to survive. While some sanctioned families find employment,
sell possessions, and turn to family members for support, one study found that
sanctioning is also associated with illegal activities, such as begging and
63
stealing.
E. Reasons for Noncompliance with Work Rules
Several studies have demonstrated that clients’ reasons for noncompliance
are frequently linked to their disadvantaged status, or obstacles that interfere
with work. For example, in California, a survey of local county welfare offices
and advocacy groups listed illness or a disability (84%), followed by a lack of
transportation (70%) and then child care (42%), as the most common reasons
64
why clients were unable to comply with the work rules.
In New York,
recipients reported lack of transportation or child care, illness, or the need to
care for a sick relative as the most common reasons for why they failed to
65
comply. Similarly, a survey of sanctioned families in Utah revealed that a third
66
of families cited health problems as the reason they did not comply. In Iowa,
the three most common reasons cited by clients for not complying with the work
rules were a serious personal issue or health problems (29.6%), a lack of
67
transportation (27.8%), and a lack of child care (20.4%).
Clients may also fail to comply because they do not understand the work
rules. Certain health problems, including depression and learning disabilities, or
low educational skills or intelligence, may make it difficult for them to

62. John T. Cook et al., Welfare Reform and the Health of Young Children: A Sentinel Survey in 6 US
Cities, 156 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 678, 681 (2002) (finding that children aged
three or under in sanctioned families were significantly more likely to be in food-insecure
households; also finding that children aged three or under in sanctioned families were 1.8 times
more likely to be hospitalized after an emergency room visit).
63. Cherlin et al., supra note 48, at 400 (finding that the most common responses to sanctions or
benefit termination were to pursue employment, cut back on necessities, and obtain assistance from
family and friends); Kalil et al., supra note 48, at 649, 652 (finding that sanctioned clients engaged in
such hardship-mitigating activities as “pawning or selling possessions, taking food or items from
stores without paying for them, searching in trash cans or begging, and engaging in illegal activity,
and selling or trading food stamps.”).
64. CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., GOOD CAUSE ESTABLISHMENT, COMPLIANCE AND CURING
SANCTIONS: CALWORKS WELFARE TO WORK PROGRAM (2001), available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.
gov/research/res/pdf/SanctionReport.pdf#xml=http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/cdssweb/dtSearch
ASP/dtsearch2.asp?cmd=pdfhits&DocId=17949&Index=d%3a%5cinetpub%5capproot%5cdtsearchin
dexes%5cCDSSInternet&HitCount=12&hits=1+2+3+32+33+34+1cf+1d0+1d1+7b9+7ba+7bb+&hc=14
1&req=%22good+cause+establishment%22.
65. Jean Oggins & Amy Fleming, Welfare Reform Sanctions and Financial Strain in a Food-Pantry
Sample, 28 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 101, 112-113 (2001).
66. MICHELLE DERR, UNIV. OF UTAH, THE IMPACT OF GRANT SANCTIONING ON UTAH’S TANF
FAMILIES (1998).
67. THOMAS M. FRAKER ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH INC., IOWA’S LIMITED BENEFIT
PLAN tbl.VI.4 (1997), http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/hsp/isp/iowalbp/Cover.htm; see also Emily Bazelon
& Tamara Watts, Welfare Time Limits on the Ground: An Empirical Study of Connecticut’s Jobs First, 32
CONN. L. REV. 717, 805 (2000) (finding a range of reasons for missed work appointments in
Connecticut’s TANF program, including illness, lack of child care, conflicts on the job).
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understand the tasks required to comply with the work rules, or the
68
consequences of not doing so. Thus, sanctions can result not because clients
69
are unwilling to comply, but because they are unable to.
In sum, there are a range of personal and family challenges that may
interfere with a recipient’s ability to work and which can result in a sanction.
Less attention, however, has been paid to the role of agency error in the
sanctioning process, and agency-created obstacles that make it difficult for
clients to comply. Several studies have suggested that there are problems in the
administration of sanctions. A review of case closures in Tennessee revealed
70
that caseworkers improperly applied sanctions in thirty percent of the cases.
An independent government audit in Wisconsin also found a high rate of error
71
in imposing sanctions. Finally, many sanctions are reversed at fair hearings
72
because of agency error.
What is causing these agency errors, however, is less clear. In the past,
welfare bureaucracies have been criticized for creating an eligibility compliance
culture characterized by administrative disorganization, an excessive
preoccupation with paperwork, miscommunication between clients and
73
workers, and an overall skepticism of clients’ claims. The procedural hurdles,
or red tape, created by such a culture often result in bureaucratic disentitlement,
74
or the denial of aid to eligible people based on process, not substance.
There is some evidence that similar problems and errors are occurring in
welfare offices today in the administration of sanctions. For example, in the
Iowa study cited above, clients complained that case workers were
unsupportive of clients, were generally unresponsive, did not return phone
75
calls, and failed to send notices or record client phone calls or participation. Of
those clients who informed caseworkers about various barriers to working, twothirds reported that their caseworkers did not help them resolve their

68. See EILEEN SWEENEY, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, RECENT STUDIES INDICATE THAT
MANY PARENTS WHO ARE CURRENT OR FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS HAVE DISABILITIES OR OTHER
MEDICAL CONDITIONS (2000), available at http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/Devolution/CBPP_Recent_
studies_indicate_many_parents_are_current_or_former_welfare_recipients_have_disabilities_00331_
02668.pdf; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: MORE COORDINATED FEDERAL
EFFORT COULD HELP STATES AND LOCALITIES MOVE TANF RECIPIENTS WITH IMPAIRMENTS TOWARD
EMPLOYMENT (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0237.pdf.
69. FEIN & LEE, supra note 45, at 13-14; DERR, supra note 66.
70. HEIDI GOLDBERG & LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, A COMPLIANCEORIENTED APPROACH TO SANCTIONS IN STATE AND COUNTY TANF PROGRAMS 19 (2000), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/10-1-00sliip.pdf.
71. WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION: WISCONSIN WORKS (W-2) PROGRAM 7
(2005), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/05-6full.pdf.
72. Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement after Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 12
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 50 (2005) (finding reversal rates in work related hearings of 53% in
Texas, 52% in Wisconsin, and 77% in New York).
73. See Thomas J. Kane & Mary Jo Bane, The Context for Welfare Reform, in WELFARE REALITIES:
FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 15-20 (Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood eds., 1994) (discussing the
characteristics of an eligibility compliance culture); see also Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic
Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3 (1984).
74. LIPSKY, supra note 73, at 3.
75. See FRAKER ET AL., supra note 67.
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problems. A more recent study in Michigan suggested that confusion and
mismanagement in the administration of work requirements caused at least
77
some of the recent decline in caseloads. For example, an agency’s failure to
fully, clearly, and appropriately explain the rules to clients with mental health
problems or other problems that make it difficult for them to understand the
78
work rules may result in misapplied sanctions.
Thus, as these studies
demonstrate, agency error and administrative obstacles may significantly
contribute to clients’ alleged noncompliance with the work rules.
The next section reports on the findings of an empirical study designed to
more fully understand how the sanctioning process works on the front lines of
welfare. Using fair hearing data from Texas, the study asks the following: What
violations of the work rules are occurring? What are the reasons clients provide
for noncompliance with these rules? What problems or obstacles do clients
encounter within the agency when attempting to comply? What mistakes or
errors are being made by the agency when imposing sanctions?
III. STUDY FINDINGS
A. Research Design
This study utilizes fair hearing decisions to examine the sanctioning
process. Fair hearings are an administrative mechanism for correcting agency
error or mistakes in the administration of public assistance. They are requested
79
by clients to challenge an adverse agency action, including sanctions. In Texas,
as in all other states, clients are entitled to challenge any denial, discontinuance,
or reduction in assistance and must be provided with timely and adequate
80
notice of any adverse action, including information about their right to appeal.
Hearings are held by the state agency to determine whether the local agency’s
action was correct.
76.
77.

Id.
EVELYN Z. BRODKIN ET AL., ACCESSING THE SAFETY NET: ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS TO PUBLIC
BENEFITS IN METROPOLITAN CHICAGO 45-47 (2005).
78. Misapplied sanctions were especially a problem in the early years of welfare reform. The
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, after an eight state study of
how sanctions were being administered, found that “more than two-thirds of the TANF offices do
not provide clear and complete information about the amount of sanctions and the definitions of
good cause exemptions from work requirements.” DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EDUCATING
CLIENTS ABOUT SANCTIONS 2 (1999), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-9800291.pdf#search=‘Office%20of%20INspector%20General%20’Educating%20Clients%20About%20Sa
nctions’ [hereinafter EDUCATING CLIENTS].
79. Fair hearings have been required since the enactment of the Aid to Dependent Children
program in 1935. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which
required states to provide pre-termination hearings, fair hearing use increased and became a fixed
feature of the welfare bureaucracy. See Cesar Perales, The Fair Hearing Process: Guardian of the Social
Service System, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 895 (1990); Under PRWORA, states are still required to
maintain a hearing system, although there is no longer any federal oversight. 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2000). All states, except for Wisconsin, have substantially retained their ADFC fair
hearing systems. Welfare Law Ctr., Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in the Aftermath of Welfare
Reform, WELFARE NEWS (Sept., 1998).
80. 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 811.14(b) (2005); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 811.71-811.73 (2005).
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Because of the nature of the adversarial process, the fair hearing record
81
leaves a rich data trail on frontline interactions between clients and workers.
Both the client and agency are expected to present their case orally, confront and
cross-examine witnesses or each other, and submit evidence. Hearing officers
are required to explain their decision in writing, which typically includes a
summary of each side’s position, and findings of fact and law. The decisions can
thus provide a useful description and analysis of contested events.
Statistical data was first obtained to determine the reversal rate on workrelated hearings in Texas during 2002. This data was obtained from the Texas
Department of Human Services (now the Texas Health and Human Services
82
Commission) through the Texas Freedom of Information Law. Two regions in
Texas were chosen to provide a contrast between a primarily urban/suburban
area and a more rural area. The regions reflect geographical distinctions made
by the Texas Department of Human Services, which divided the state into ten
separate regions. One region is a well-populated urban/suburban region and
83
the other region is a rural region with no large cities. This data revealed a
statewide reversal rate of fifty-three percent, indicating a high likelihood of
errors in sanctioning, since more than half of the clients successfully won
reversal.
The Texas Freedom of Information Law was also used to request a random
sample of every other fair hearing decision on work rules issued in 2002. The
total sample was made up of 178 decisions, including 109 decisions from the
84
urban/suburban region and 69 from the rural region. The decisions were then
analyzed using content analysis. Content analysis is a method for systematically

81. While hearings are used primarily to resolve individual cases, their usefulness for
“detecting and correcting improper administration” has been recognized through the years. Joel
Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in AFDC-the Wisconsin Experience, 4 SOC. SERV.
REV. 12, 18 (1969). In the initial years of the ADC program, as individual counties came under state
supervision for the first time, fair hearings helped to standardize the administration of benefits. Id.
at 18. A study conducted a decade after Goldberg v. Kelly, in 1979, on the usefulness of fair hearings
for monitoring agency performance found that they could be used to “isolate particular breakdowns
which occur in the administration of state AFDC programs.” Stan Altman et al., The Use of State Fair
Hearing Data to Monitor Performance of the AFDC Program, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 482 (1979). Using a
seven state sample, the researchers examined whether patterns in fair hearing data based on issues
appealed and outcomes could provide “diagnostic information [on] . . . operational failures”
including inconsistent, conflicting or unclear procedures or policies. Id. at 478. They concluded that
if a disproportionate number of agency decisions on specific issues were reversed by a formal
hearing decision, it could indicate a problem in applying or interpreting certain policies on the
frontline. Id. at 476. Even decisions where clients lost more often than not, could be useful in
demonstrating problems within the system, such as a failure to clearly communicate rules and
expectations. Id. at 480. The researchers found that hearings were useful for identifying systemic
flaws even in states with low levels of fair hearing activity. Id. at 471, 482.
82. 5 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.021 (Vernon 2004).
83. Regions rather than individual counties were chosen to permit an adequate sample size.
Also, because fair hearing decisions are maintained by region, the report indicated only the county
where the hearing officer is presiding, which may or may not be the county where the event took
place.
84. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 5.67 (2005) and 5 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (Vernon 2004),
personal identification information, including certain demographic information will redacted from
the decisions to protect the privacy of recipients.
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examining data by coding it, or breaking it down into parts or categories to
85
identify themes and patterns.
B. Description of Texas Works
86

Texas’s work program, called Texas Works, was initiated in 1997.
Although federal law allows five years of assistance, Texas has chosen stricter
time limits. The most educated and experienced clients receive one year of
87
assistance and the least educated receive three years of assistance. However,
unlike many other states, at the time of this study, Texas chose a more lenient
88
approach to sanctions.
At the time of the study, Texas imposed only partial
sanctions for violations of the work rules: reducing the family’s grant by
seventy-eight dollars for failing to participate in its welfare-to-work program,
89
Choices, and fining a client twenty-five dollars for voluntarily quitting a job.
Minimum penalty periods also applied: one month (or until the client complied,
whichever is longer) for the first noncompliance and then three and six months
90
thereafter.
Texas views an application for assistance as a request for help in finding a
91
job. As part of the application process, applicants are required to complete an
employment profile and to visit an on-site resource room which contains local
job postings, lists of community resources, and child care information. Unless
exempt from the work rules, they are referred to the Choices work program.
Parties that are exempt include children under eighteen, adults over sixty,
pregnant women, adults caring for a child under the age of one or a disabled
household member, adults unable to work because of a disability expected to

85. See MATTHEW B. MILES & MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS (1994)
(providing a practical guide to data and content analysis for the researcher, as well as commentary
on the merits of various analytical methods).
86. TEX. DEP’T. OF HUMAN SERVS., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF)
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/programs/TexasWorks/TANFFAQ.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
87. Id. Clients with a high school education or better, or with work experience of at least
eighteen months can only receive assistance for one year, while for those with less than three years
of high school or less than six months of experience, the limit is three years. Id. There is a two year
limit for clients who completed at least three years of high school or who have work experience of
six to eighteen months. Id.
88. As noted supra, seventeen states impose an immediate full family sanction, while another
eighteen states impose a gradual full-family sanction. As of November, 2003, Texas began imposing
full-family sanctions. Letter from Luis M. Macias, Director, Workforce Dev. Div., Tex. Workforce
Comm., to Local Workforce Dev. Bd. Executive Dirs. et al., New Choices Rules Effective November
18, 2003 2, 6 (Jan. 9, 2004) available at http://www.twc.state.tx.us/boards/wdletters/letters/0604.pdf.
89. TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM’N, TEXAS WORKS HANDBOOK § 2135 (02-05 rev. ed.,
2005). The maximum grant for a family of three is about $200, thus a sanction can reduce the grant
by more than a third. For two parent households where both parents are not in compliance the
financial penalty is $125. TEX. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., REFERENCE GUIDE: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE
FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) (1999), available at www.dhs.state.tx.us/publications/refguide/
1999/sec2-7.html.
90. TEX. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM’N, supra note 89, at § 1841.
91. Id. at § 111 (“[I]f an applicant chooses to apply for assistance, he is requesting help finding a
job.”).
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last more than 180 days, and a grandparent over age fifty caring for a grandchild
92
under age three.
Clients are required to sign a personal responsibility
agreement that covers personal behavior ranging from work, to parenting, to the
93
use of drugs.
Clients are referred to a separate state agency, the Texas Workforce
Commission, which operates through local workforce development boards and
their service contractors (profit and nonprofit) to provide all work-related
services and to monitor the client’s compliance with work requirements. Clients
attend an initial orientation to familiarize themselves with the local labor market
94
and available resources for finding jobs. They are required to search for work
and if they do not find a job, they must attend an “employment planning
session” and then must participate in various Choices employment services
programs.
These programs include vocational training, job search and
placement, on-the-job training, and for those who still cannot find a job,
community service placement.
Violations of the work rules can occur either during activities designed to
prepare clients for work (i.e. employment planning sessions, career
advancement classes, job search training conducted through the local workforce
boards) or when clients are actually working or searching for a job and are
required to report their hours or job contacts. The Choices staff decides whether
95
a violation has occurred and if the client has “good cause” for not complying.
The Texas Department of Human Services is responsible for implementing the
sanction.
C. Description of the Findings
Sanctions were most commonly imposed during the work preparation
stage, and most―71% in the rural region and 67.8% in the urban/suburban
region―were based on a single missed appointment by the client at the
workforce agency. Less than a third of clients were sanctioned for failing to
work a sufficient number of hours, or for not having sufficient job contacts.
Thus, based on fair hearing records, sanctions were primarily used to insure that
clients attended the various activities required by the local workforce boards to
prepare them for work.
In both regions, a combination of administrative and personal barriers
resulted in sanctions. In the urban/suburban region the most common reason
clients gave for not complying with work rules was a medical or other
92. Id. at § 1821.1.
93. As workers, they must agree to participate in job training or educational programs or to not
voluntarily quit a job. As parents, they must cooperate with child support enforcement, agree to
keep their children in school, have their children immunized and bring them to health screenings,
and attend parenting classes, if requested. They must also agree not to abuse alcohol or drugs. Id. at
§ 2110.
94. Id. at § 2213.
95. Good cause is defined in the regulations as temporary illness or incapacitation, court
appearance, caring for a physically or mentally disabled household member, lack of transportation
or child care, an absence of support services, an individual or family crisis or family circumstance
(including substance abuse, mental health or disability-related issues), and domestic violence. 40
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 811.16(c) (2005).
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exemption (31%); the second most common reason was that notice of the
appointment was never received (22%). 18% claimed a family emergency or
temporary illness, and 13% said work or school obligations prevented them
from complying. 16% cited problems with transportation or child care. 14%
96
claimed that they had complied, and that the agency’s records were in error.
Thus, in the urban/suburban region, personal barriers, such as disabilities,
childcare and transportation problems, as well as family emergencies, were cited
more often than administrative barriers, such as scheduling conflicts with work
or school, lack of notice, and agency error (65% to 49%).
In the rural region, the most common reason for noncompliance was that
the notice of appointment was never received (41%). Equal percentages (18%)
claimed either a medical or other exemption, or said that they had in fact
complied. 13% claimed work or school obligations prevented them from
complying. 10% cited problems with child care or transportation, while only 3%
claimed a family emergency or crisis. Thus, in contrast to the urban/suburban
region, administrative barriers (scheduling conflicts with work or school, lack of
notice, and agency error) were cited more often than personal barriers
(disabilities, childcare and transportation problems, and family emergencies) for
rural residents (72% to 31%). Each of the reasons given, and the agency errors
that occurred in the sanctioning process, are examined separately below.
Table 1: Reasons for Noncompliance
Reason
Scheduling conflict with
work or school
Agency error
Transportation/child care
Family emergency/illness
Nonreceipt of notice of date
of appointment
Medical or other exemptions

Urban/Suburban Region
13%

Rural Region
13%

14%
16%
18%
22%

18%
10%
3%
41%

31%

18%

1. Medical or Other Exemptions
In the urban/suburban region, a frequent complaint by sanctioned clients
was that the agency had ignored medical documentation verifying their
exemption. 57% of clients who claimed a medical or other exemption from the
work rules (medical, caretaker, or pregnancy) had their sanction reversed. The
hearing officers found a range of errors, including the improper coding of clients
as nonexempt despite evidence to the contrary, the failure to advise clients of the
documentation needed to prove an exemption, or failure to assist clients in
documenting their disabilities.
In several cases, the agency had ignored medical evidence in its own files
and admitted at the hearing that the sanction was in error. Other times the
96. The total of the percentages is more than 100% because clients gave multiple reasons for not
complying.
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agency failed to communicate to clients what was needed to prove an
exemption. In one such example, a client with a documented disability of more
than three years was denied an exemption because her physician did not
indicate how long her disability was expected to last, as required by the agency.
The hearing officer reversed the sanction, noting that the agency had failed to
advise the client that her documentation was incomplete. The hearing officer
also held that the “worker must offer reasonable assistance in obtaining
information.” In another case, the hearing officer found that the agency had not
fully explained the exemption process and had not given the client an
opportunity to provide a physician’s note documenting her pregnancy. In other
instances, clients were often given erroneous information about documentation
requirements. For example, one client whose sanction was reversed was told by
the agency that she did not need a physician’s note to verify that she cared for
her father who was on dialysis three times a week.
Those clients whose sanctions were upheld expressed confusion over the
requirements for a medical exemption and had difficulty proving that they were
disabled. Some claimed poor health, but never told the agency until after the
sanction was imposed or never followed through with the agency’s requests (or
the hearing officer’s request) to verify their disability. Unlike those clients
whose sanctions were reversed, very few of these clients claimed they had
submitted verification that was ignored by the agency. Overall, this group was
more confused and less willing or less able to secure the needed documents to
prove a medical or other exemption. For example, one client who had problems
lifting over five to ten pounds and expected to have surgery, never provided a
doctor’s note. Another client testified that she was in poor health and that it was
hard for her to work, but did not report her health problems until she was at the
hearing. Another, whose SSI benefits had been cut after four years, thought
reporting to her work appointment might jeopardize her SSI appeal. In a few
cases, the hearing officer found that the clients were disabled, but that the
agency was correct in imposing the sanction, because it did not have any
medical verification when the decision was made.
In the rural region, 50% of the medical exemption cases were decided in
favor of the client. Here, as in the urban/suburban region, there was some
indication that agency workers were missing important cues that the client was
disabled or were ignoring submitted medical evidence. For example, in one
case, the client had been terminated from a job because of medical problems.
The hearing officer found that the agency “did not thoroughly grasp, explore,
and/or document in her electronic case file the information the client provided
regarding her employments status” and also “did not follow established
procedure in allowing client an opportunity to provide verification of her
inability to return to work.” In another case reversed by the hearing officer, the
agency sanctioned the client before the time limit for providing medical
documentation.
Clients in the rural region whose sanctions were upheld either failed to
provide medical verification, provided it too late, or submitted medical forms
that did not establish a disability.
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2. Nonreceipt of Appointment Letters
In both the urban/suburban and the rural region, many clients claimed to
have never received the notice advising them of their appointment. Most of
these clients said that the notice advising them of the sanction was the first time
they discovered the missed appointment had been scheduled.
In the
urban/suburban region 38% of clients had these sanctions reversed. In the rural
region the percentage was 55%.
In the urban/suburban region, the hearing officer most often reversed
sanctions based on agency error (such as by sending the appointment letter to
the wrong address or not sending one at all). In contrast, most reversals in the
rural region were attributed to mail delivery problems and not agency error.
Thus, both agency errors and client mistakes served as a basis for sanction
reversals in different areas. However, in both regions, complaints that
appointment notices had not been received were often met with skepticism and
the sanction was upheld.
Clients, whether they won or lost, shared some common experiences.
Several had inconsistent contact with the agency because they moved among
different relatives or friends and lacked stable living arrangements. One client
explained that she had recently moved and had not yet acquired a permanent
address, thus she never received her appointment notice. Another client
described how she had been hospitalized and then moved, events that made
contact with the agency difficult.
Other clients spoke of difficulty getting through to their agency workers.
For example, one client never received the notice of appointment, but did
receive a notice to telephone his agency worker at the local workforce office. He
testified to three unsuccessful attempts to reach his agency worker, who was
first at lunch, then at a doctor’s appointment, and then at a training. He
explained that “each call cost him fifty cents and that he didn’t have the money
to keep on calling.” In another case, an agency worker from the workforce office
verified that the client, who had never received the appointment letter, had tried
to contact the local welfare office, but no one had returned his calls. In this case,
the workforce office attempted to reverse the sanction, because no appointment
had ever been scheduled for the client to miss. Nevertheless, the sanction
remained, indicating communication problems between the workforce office
and the local welfare office.
3. Work/School Scheduling Conflicts
In both regions, sanctioned clients included those who were already
working and/or attending school. For several of these clients, their workforce
appointment was scheduled when they were working, thus making it difficult
for them to attend. Other clients were sanctioned for not working enough hours
or for not working or looking for a job during holiday breaks.
In the urban/suburban region, only 31% of clients had their sanction
reversed. A particularly egregious case, later reversed by the hearing officer,
occurred when a worker, without any regulatory authority, required a client to
search for jobs during her Christmas Break from school. The client, a
grandmother who cared for two grandchildren, attended classes during the
semester and was engaged in community service and work in the afternoon.

11_LENS.DOC

4/28/2006 8:59 AM

WORK SANCTIONS UNDER WELFARE REFORM

273

The hearing officer chastised the agency worker for not using common sense or
her knowledge of the rules when requiring the client to search for a job during
her Christmas break. The hearing officer also noted that the agency worker had
failed to accommodate the client’s request to schedule work meetings on Friday
morning, even though the agency worker was available at that time. In another
case, the hearing officer reversed a sanction for a client who had missed his
appointment because he was working sixty to seventy hours a week driving a
cab.
For the most part, however, urban/suburban clients who claimed that they
were too busy working to attend work appointments had their sanctions
upheld. One such example is a client who explained that she was busy cleaning
houses at the time of her work appointment. Another client, who worked in the
mornings when work appointments were usually scheduled, acknowledged that
she understood she was supposed to attend but claimed that she could not miss
work. Nevertheless, her sanction was upheld. The work rules were also strictly
applied to clients who were a few hours short of the required thirty hour
workweek. For example, one client was sanctioned although she had recently
increased her work hours from twenty to twenty-five by working for two
different employers.
Clients with work-related excuses from the rural region fared better, with
forty-four percent winning their cases. When reversing sanctions, hearing
officers often cited miscommunication between client and worker, as well as
agency error. In one case, a client was scheduled for a Choices appointment the
day she was to start a new job. When she contacted her Choices worker, she was
told that she still had to attend the meeting or she would not get her public
assistance check. She decided not to miss the first day of work to attend the
Choices meeting. In another case, a client was working thirty hours and reported
her time, but was unaware that she also had to attend career advancement
classes. Another client was mistakenly told by the agency she that was exempt
because she was attending school. A third client was sanctioned even though
she was working the required number of hours.
4. Family Crisis, Illness, and Logistical Problems
In the urban/suburban region, only 23% of clients who claimed an
assortment of logistical and personal problems, including sick children, child
care difficulties, and transportation obstacles, had their sanctions reversed. All
of these clients were working or trying to work, but doing so erratically or for
fewer hours than required. The most common pattern was consistent
participation in work activities, followed by a decline in hours because of a
family crisis, illness, or other difficulty.
The hearing officers in these cases typically found that the work
requirements were not met and/or that good cause had not been established,
even though clients testified to myriad problems. In one example, the client had
complied with agency requirements for several months, even completing thirty
extra hours of job search activities in one month. Over the next several months,
her hours dipped below the mandatory minimum number. Required to
produce fifteen job contacts one week, she produced only twelve and was finally
sanctioned. She attributed her reduced work hours to medical problems with
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her children, including two doctor’s appointments for one son and a
hospitalization for another.
In another case in which the sanction was upheld, the client also had an
uneven work record, sometimes working more than the number of hours
required and other times fewer hours. Sanctioned for missing an orientation
and job search class, she explained that she did not have daycare and could not
bring her four children to such a class. She was told by the agency at the
hearing that she could bring them with her to the location, but not into the job
search room itself because of the expensive computers. The agency did not
explain who would watch the children in the waiting room.
In another case in which the client lost, she chose to remain in Choices even
though she was exempt for four months after the birth of her child. She
complied for several months, but was sanctioned after she turned in her job
search paper late (with more than the required contacts) and for missing some
hours “because she was either at a doctor’s appointment getting shots for her
children, or at a WIC appointment.” She subsequently began community
service and then obtained a job.
Other clients who lost their cases reported a variety of problems. One
client explained that she had failed to start community service because “of
serious family problems that caused her face to bruise, and she didn’t want to go
out in public.” During this time, she also moved in with a relative and had a
child constantly sick from daycare. She noted that “she did turn in two weeks of
job search in spite of all the things that were happening.” Another client had
been in jail and another had to temporarily move in with friends while she
looked for permanent housing.
In those few cases where the sanctions were reversed, the hearing officer
found either a mistake on the part of the agency, because clear instructions had
not been provided, or that the clients had stayed in close contact with the agency
during a family crisis or illness. For example, one client whose sister’s child
died on the day of her appointment, called the agency that day and then again
when she had to leave town for her mother’s illness. Another client, whose
daughter was ill on the day of the appointment, testified to numerous and
repeated attempts to call the agency. She described how she “started [dialing]
extensions at random and left voice mail messages for everyone she found,”
with not one person answering their phone. The hearing officer found that the
agency was correctly implementing policy, but reversed the sanction because
the client had made every effort to contact the agency the day of her
appointment.
In the rural region, many of the cases involved a lack of transportation or
97
child care, with the two sometimes connected. Clients won 62% percent of the
cases in this category. In one such successful case, the agency and the Choices
representatives who had imposed the sanction, argued at the hearing that the
client should not be sanctioned. They explained that the client, despite
graduating at the head of her class, was unable to get a job because of the lack of
employment opportunities in the small community where she lived and because

97.

For example, one woman explained that it took three hours to get her son to daycare.
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the entry-level jobs that did exist only offered the evening shift, when public
transportation had stopped running.
5. Agency Error
While all categories of cases described above often contained some
allegation of agency error, the following cases focused primarily on alleged
administrative errors. In the urban/suburban region, the agency was reversed
73% of the time. Some of these errors were of the type expected in any
bureaucracy; for example, mistakenly scheduling an appointment when a case
was not yet active on the computer or ignoring a change of address request.
Other cases however revealed more avoidable problems. For example, in one
case the hearing officer found that the workforce agency “[h]ad requested a
sanction before the appellant showed up for the appointment” for which she
was late.
In another case, a client was two minutes late for a required test. She
rescheduled that day and had already taken the test when she then received the
sanction notice. The workforce agency representative testified that she tried to
reverse the sanction, but that it did not go through the computer system, so she
advised the client to appeal instead.
Other times the agency gave clients incorrect information; for example,
erroneously advising a client that no appointment was scheduled. Clients also
complained of difficulties getting through to their agency workers. One client
was told her agency worker was not accepting calls and then was later told by
the agency worker that she only accepts calls on one particular day of the week.
In another case, the career counselor explained that around the time of the
sanction, he “was having problems receiving his messages on a consistent
basis . . . and [that] several other individuals told him they had left messages for
him, but he did not receive them.”
In the rural region, clients’ success rate was 61% when agency error was
alleged. Problems identified by the hearing officer included the agency’s failure
98
to fully and accurately inform clients of program requirements.
Table 2: Client Success Rates
Reason
Scheduling conflict with work
or school
Agency error
Transportation/childcare
family emergency/illness
Nonreceipt of notice of date of
appointment
Medical or other exemption

98.

Urban/Suburban Region
31%

Rural Region
44%

73%
23%

61%
62%

38%

55%

57%

50%

For example, changes in employment rules and the number of hours required to be worked.
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D. Summary of the Findings
In summary, the findings of this study demonstrate several problems in the
administration of sanctions. First, personal barriers, such as disabilities, family
crises, and a lack of transportation or childcare, made it difficult for clients to
comply with the work rules. Erroneous sanctions resulted when workers
overlooked these barriers or failed to fully assist clients to overcome or
document them. Second, administrative errors also resulted in incorrect
sanctions. Some errors were clerical mistakes that can plague any large
bureaucracy, but others were less benign. Less benign errors were committed
by workers who automatically entered sanctions into the system without
evaluating the reasons for the noncompliance, as well as workers who were
difficult to contact or who failed to provide accurate information, thereby
causing miscommunications.
Finally, technically correct but ill-advised
sanctions also resulted both because of the nature of the rules and the way they
were applied.
As an example of the latter, in several cases, sanctions were imposed
despite personal and family challenges and then not reversed by the hearing
officer. It is plausible that these clients’ explanations of family difficulties were
not credible and thus rejected by the hearing officers. However, it seems that a
singular and strict adherence to the rules, rather than the goals behind the rules,
may have played a role. For instance, several of these clients were sanctioned
for working less than the required number of hours, even when their work
history, as detailed by the hearing officer, demonstrated a commitment to
99
work. A more complex look at their history and current situation and a more
flexible approach to sanctions might have resulted in supportive services
instead. Similarly, several clients were sanctioned for missing an appointment
because of work, thus indicating that technical compliance with the rules was
more important than the purpose of the rules, which is to encourage work. In
short, a too rigid rule, combined with an inflexible application, resulted in
sanctions that were deemed correct by the hearing officer, but that were
arguably inappropriate.
The fact that the vast majority of sanctions were for missing a single
appointment, reveals a mechanistic approach to sanctioning. Workers only had
to determine whether the appointment was missed; a full assessment of the
complexity and totality of clients’ work experiences and attitudes was not
100
required. Thus, imposing a sanction became a clerical chore and, even though
technically correct, may have subverted rather than encouraged a client’s
attempt to work.
In sum, the findings of this study indicate a need for welfare bureaucracies
to focus on avoiding erroneous sanctions, and to avoid applying them too
rigidly and bureaucratically. This and other studies which have documented

99. For example, working extra hours in the past, or volunteering to work even when exempt.
100. It may be the case that workers had given the client multiple chances to comply, but that
such information was not included in the record because one missed appointment was sufficient to
impose a sanction. However, as described above, there was evidence in the record that workers
followed a more perfunctory approach to sanctioning.
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the disadvantages faced by sanctioned clients also raise the question of the
efficacy of sanctions in general, and whether there are other more appropriate
and effective ways to encourage and to support working, as discussed in the
next section.
IV. DO SANCTIONS WORK?
Sanctions are based on the premise that poor women will change their
102
work behavior to avoid the loss of all or part of their welfare grant. Implicit in
this approach are two assumptions: that low-income women have poor attitudes
towards work, and that financial penalties will alter their behavior. These
assumptions, that poor women’s work habits are suspect and that they must be
compelled to work, have been the subject of scholarly debate for many decades.
Conservatives generally believe that a poor work ethic, a lack of personal
responsibility, and an unhealthy dependence on government benefits are the
103
primary causes of poverty. Their solution is to require work in exchange for
benefits. Conversely, liberals argue that the behavior of labor markets, rather
104
than the behavior of individuals, is to blame. PRWORA’s rules on sanctions
and work participation embodies the conservative view, although the law seeks
to help women achieve self-sufficiency by providing child care, some training
opportunities, and other supportive services.
These opposing views of the causes and cures for welfare dependency have
replicated themselves in the debate over whether welfare reform has been
effective. Certain facts, however, are incontrovertible. The welfare rolls have
declined. In 1996, the year the welfare reform act was enacted, nearly 4.5 million
families received assistance, whereas in June 2003, that number stood at a little
105
over 2 million.
More poor women, including those who have historically
relied on welfare, are working. Between 1989 and 2000 the labor force
participation of these women went from close to thirty percent to close to fifty106
seven percent, with the sharpest increases coming after welfare reform. Child

101. See discussion supra, in Part II C.
102. As discussed supra in note 2, sanctions disproportionately affect women, as 90% of the
recipients of public assistance are women. Therefore, the word “women” is used interchangeably
with “recipients” throughout this article.
103. For a discussion of this view of poverty by its proponents, see LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE
NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY (1992); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984).
104. For a discussion of the connection between public assistance programs and the labor
market, see PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 10. For a discussion of the political and ideological
currents underlying changes in public assistance programs over the years, see Hugh Heclo, The
Politics of Welfare Reform in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 169-200 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins
eds., 2001). See generally ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 3, for a feminist perspective on welfare reform.
105. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Average Monthly Families and Recipients
for Calendar Years 1936-2001, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/news/stats/3697.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2005). U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., TANF Caseloads Reported as of 12/02/03,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/press/2003/mar03_jun03.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
106. Blank & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 73.
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poverty rates have also declined from 37.7% in 1996 to 34.5% in 2003. Thus, it
would appear that more poor women are working and less of their children are
poor.
However, behind these numbers is another set of questions. Did welfare
reform, or the economy, or both contribute to the increase in work and decrease
in poverty rates? If welfare reform was the cause, was the change brought about
by the reform’s punitive aspects (sanctions and time limits), its supportive
aspects (child care, work incentives, and other services), or both? How large a
role did other anti-poverty policies play, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
108
(EITC) or the increase in the national minimum wage? Sorting out the answers
to these questions has been difficult because these factors are so closely related.
It is clear that economic forces and policy changes unrelated to welfare
reform were at least partially responsible for increased employment among poor
women, especially during the robust economy when welfare reform was
implemented.
During these robust years, which lasted until 2001,
unemployment reached historic lows, and jobs were being generated for low109
skilled workers at increased wage rates, especially for women.
In addition,
policy changes including the substantial expansion of the EITC in the first half of
the 1990s and the increase in the minimum wage in the late 1990s, also made
110
work more attractive and profitable for the poor.
Many women on welfare
have previously worked, and use welfare as a transitional program until they
obtain new work, while other long-term users cycle between work and
111
welfare. The expansion of the economy and policy changes made it easier for
both short term and long term recipients to cycle off, and to stay off, welfare.
However, there is also evidence that even during the economic expansion,
welfare reform played a role in the work increase, although it is not clear how
much and which aspects of the reform contributed to the increase. States with
112
stronger work incentives had a four percent higher rate of increase in labor
force participation among single mothers than states with weak work
113
incentives.
However, these strong work incentives included a mix of the
coercive (time limits and sanctions) and the supportive (high earnings
114
disregards). One study found that PRWORA’s punitive requirements—work
107. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 11: Related Children as a Proportion
of
the
Poverty
Population
by
Race
and
Hispanic
Origin:
1959-2003,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov11.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
108. The EITC is a refundable tax credit that decreases tax liability for low-wage workers, and
acts as a supplement to wages for the poorest workers. By 2000, the EITC program was larger than
TANF, Food Stamps, or SSI. Blank & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 86. In addition, in 1999, the minimum
wage was increased to $5.15. Id.
109. Id. at 75.
110. Id. at 96.
111. Welfare caseloads include short-termers, who use welfare for transitional assistance, and
long-termers, who move on and off the rolls in any given year. Bane & Ellwood, supra note 10, at 4041.
112. Strong work incentives include low benefits, high earnings disregards, strict sanctions, and
shorter time limits.
113. Blank & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 83.
114. Earned income disregards are the amount of work income recipients get to keep without the
income being applied against their grant. Rather than reducing benefits dollar-for-dollar, for every
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requirements and time limits—accounted for seventeen percent and ten percent
respectively of the increased participation in the workforce among single
115
mothers. The study also found that other key economic and policy variables
had a much larger effect, including the EITC (thirty-three percent) and
116
macroeconomic changes (twenty-five percent).
In contrast, a study by the
Council of Economic Advisors that looked at caseload declines between 1996
and 1998 attributed a large share of the decline, one-third, to welfare reform and
117
only eight to ten percent to the labor market.
Not only have there been very few studies that look specifically at the role
of sanctions in welfare reform, but such studies have produced mixed results.
For example, one study found that sanctions are associated with exits from
118
welfare due to employment. However, studies that looked more specifically at
whether sanctions caused clients to comply with the work rules when on
119
welfare, found that sanctions did not lead to compliance. The authors in one
such study concluded that it was the “clients’ circumstances and abilities to
understand the rules, rather than unwillingness to meet the requirements, that
was the cause of the noncompliance,” and further suggested that “intensive
120
outreach and services may generate better results than sanctions.” However,
since the possible deterrent effect of sanctions is not measurable, it is difficult to
determine the actual role of sanctions in welfare reform.
The economic downturn that began in 2001 also has not fully resolved the
debate over whether it is the economy or welfare reform, specifically sanctions,

dollar earned, states have adopted various and more generous disregards in order to incentivize
women to work while on welfare. Blank & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 81. Only three states do not
provide such disregards (Arkansas, Indiana, and Wisconsin). GRETCHEN ROWE & VICTORIA RUSSELL,
THE URBAN INST., THE WELFARE RULES DATABOOK AS OF JULY 2002 72, 74-75 (2004), available at
http://www.urban.org/template.cfm?Template=/TaggedContent/ViewPublication.cfm&Publicatio
nID=9082&NavMenuID=95. See id. for a description of each state’s disregard.
115. HANMING FANG & MICHAEL P. KEANE, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM ON
SINGLE MOTHERS 9 (2004), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/lec_lun/2004/keane040505.pdf#search=‘ASSESSING%20THE%20IMPACT%20OF%20WELFARE%20REFORM%20ON%
20SINGLE%20MOTHERS’.
116. Id.
117. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC EXPANSION, WELFARES REFORM, AND THE DECLINE
IN WELFARE CASELOADS: AN UPDATE 2 (1999).
118. SANDRA L. HOFFERTH ET AL., POPULATION STUDIES CTR. AT THE INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH,
UNIV. OF MICH., EXITING WELFARE IN THE 1990S: DID PUBLIC POLICY INFLUENCE RECIPIENTS
BEHAVIOR? 15 (2000), available at http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr01-469.pdf. See also
Lawrence M. Mead, Welfare Reform in Wisconsin: The Local Role, 33 ADMIN. & SOC. 523 (2001) (finding
that policy changes, including sanctions and organizational reforms, are responsible for the success
of welfare reform in Wisconsin).
119. GAYLE HAMILTON & SUSAN SCRIVENER, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP.,
PROMOTING PARTICIPATION: HOW TO INCREASE INVOLVEMENT IN WELFARE-TO-WORK ACTIVITIES 29
(1999), available at http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/Devolution/MDRC_Promoting_participation_how_
to_increase_involvement_in_welfare_to_work_activities_00331_02849.pdf#search=‘HOW%20TO%20
INCREASE%20INVOLVEMENT%20IN%20WELFARETOWORK%20ACTIVITIES’ (finding that in
programs that required clients to participate rather than making it optional and where participation
was monitored, high sanctioning rates did not increase participation). See also FEIN & LEE, supra note
45, at 38. (finding that severe penalties did not induce compliance with work rules in Delaware’s
welfare program).
120. FEIN & LEE, supra note 45, at 38-39.
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that increased poor women’s participation in the labor market. There are fewer
single-adult households (composed primarily of women) working full-time, and
more such households not working at all in 2003 than there were in 2000,
121
indicating the sensitivity of welfare reform to the economy.
In addition, the
poverty rate for single-adult households has also increased. However, so far the
increase has been slight (from 34.6% to 37.7% between 2000 and 2003) and less
than in past recessions, perhaps indicating the continuing influence of welfare
122
reform.
In sum, welfare reform, economic fluctuations, and policy changes are all
contributing factors to the increase in poor women’s labor force participation,
but it is impossible to determine precisely which variable is primarily
responsible. While welfare reform has mandated work, it is also the first time
that the entire welfare system was revamped to promote it. Along with
sanctions, support for work is also provided on an unprecedented scale.
Moreover, it is likely that all of these variables have a synergistic effect. For
instance, sanctions may compel women to work, but the increased availability of
child-care funds makes it easier for them to do so.
However, the fact that more women are working and fewer are relying on
welfare is not the end of the inquiry. The next question is whether working has
improved the financial well-being of women who left welfare. Scholars can
provide some definitive and refined answers about how such women are doing,
especially those in sub-populations among welfare users. Since welfare reform,
many states and independent researchers have conducted “welfare leaver”
studies, which follow former welfare clients over time to see how they are
123
fairing.
These studies have found that a majority of women leaving welfare, as
124
many as two-thirds, including those who have been sanctioned, do find work.

121. Between 2000 and 2003, the share of households generating full-time, full-year work
dropped from 57% to less than 50%, while the share of households with no work rose from 11.2% to
16.4%. GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE URBAN INST., HOW HAVE HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN FARED IN
THE
JOB
MARKET
DOWNTURN?
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311163_A-67.pdf.
122. Id. at 3. For example, the poverty rate of single mothers in 1994, during a recession, was
44%. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 4: Poverty Status of Families, by Type of
Family, Presence of Related Children, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 to 2003,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov4.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
123. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) within the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services commissioned more than thirty studies of welfare
leavers. States and various nonprofit research organizations also did several studies—some of
individual states and others more national in scope.
124. PAMELA LOPREST, THE URBAN INST., FAMILIES WHO LEFT WELFARE: WHO ARE THEY AND HOW
ARE THEY DOING? 8 (1999), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/discussion99-02.pdf.
This statistic is consistent with a number of U. S. Department of Health and Human Services-funded
and state-level studies which have also found that about approximately 60% of clients who leave
welfare are employed. See also GREGORY ACS & PAMELA LOPREST, UPJOHN INST. FOR EMPLOYMENT
RESEARCH, LEAVING WELFARE: EMPLOYMENT AND WELL-BEING OF FAMILIES THAT LEFT WELFARE IN
THE POST ENTITLEMENT ERA 7 (2004); SHARON PARROT, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
WELFARE RECIPIENTS WHO FIND JOBS: WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS? (1998), available at http://www.cbpp.org/11-16-98wel.htm (for a review of the various
leaver studies).
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However, women who leave welfare, even for work, fare only marginally better,
or are worse off, than when they were on welfare. Most former welfare
recipients tend to cluster in the service sector, where wages are low, jobs are
125
unstable, and employers rarely provide health care and other benefits. In one
126
1999 national study of post-welfare workers, the median wage was only $6.61.
This transition from welfare to work often results in only a few hundred dollars
127
more a month and increased work expenses for the former recipient.
Many
welfare leavers have thus joined the ranks of the working poor, with incomes
128
below the poverty line.
In addition, these welfare leavers find it difficult to
129
increase their earnings over time.
While welfare reform is gender neutral on its face, it also perpetuates
existing gender-based inequities in the workplace. Many former recipients, the
vast majority of whom are female, work in low-wage and low-end jobs in often
130
female dominated service sectors. Because welfare reform emphasizes a work-

125. PARROT, supra note 124, at 15-20. See also HEATHER BOUSHEY & DAVID ROSNICK, CTR. FOR
ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, FOR WELFARE REFORM TO WORK, JOBS MUST BE AVAILABLE (2004),
http://cepr.net/publications/welfare_reform_2004_04.htm (finding that approximately two-thirds
of former recipients work in service sector jobs, such as retail, eating and drinking establishments,
and personal care services).
126. See LOPREST, supra note 124, at 12. (finding also that 25% are earning more than $8.00 an
hour and another 25% are making less than $5.29 an hour).
127. See MARIA CANCIAN ET AL., UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON, BEFORE AND AFTER TANF: THE
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF WOMEN LEAVING WELFARE 77 (1999) (finding in Wisconsin that one year
after leaving welfare between 55% and 60% had incomes $1,000 less than the previous year, while
only about 30% had more income). See also Robert Moffitt & Katie Winder, Does it Pay to Move from
Welfare to Work? A Comment on Danziger, Heflin, Corcoran, Oltmans, and Wang, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 399 (2005) (finding income gains of $150 to $227 or 14% to 21% between working leavers and
nonworking stayers in the three cities of Boston, Chicago and San Antonio); but see Sheldon
Danziger & Hui-Chen Wang, Does it Pay to Move from Welfare to Work? Reply to Robert Moffitt and
Katie Winder, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 411, 416 (2005) (finding that in Michigan working
nonleavers do better than when on welfare, and earn more per additional hour of work than those
that combine work and welfare, although the gains are small).
128. ACS & LOPREST, supra note 124, at 8 (finding that about 40-50% of leaver families live in
poverty); CANCIAN et al., supra note 127, at 34 (finding that 63-74% of leavers had incomes below the
poverty line); PARROT, supra note 124, at 10 (finding that earnings of former recipient parents fall
well below the poverty line in all of the states studied).
129. See Melissa Wavelet & Jacquie Anderson, Promoting Self-Sufficiency: What We Know About
Sustaining Employment and Increasing Income among Welfare Recipients and the Working Poor, 22 FOCUS
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 56 (2002) (noting that job advancement among low wage workers, and especially
among those without a high school education, is very limited). See also JULIE STRAWN, CTR. FOR LAW
& SOC. POLICY, WHY CONGRESS SHOULD EXPAND, NOT CUT, ACCESS TO LONG-TERM TRAINING IN
TANF 2 (2004), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/TANF_Postsec.pdf (noting that
former recipients in low wage jobs experience little earnings growth).
130. About two-thirds of former recipients work in service sector jobs, such as retail, eating and
drinking establishments, and personal care services. See BOUSHEY & ROSNICK, supra note 125.
Service sector jobs are often predominantly female; for example, in 2004, 91.8% of nursing,
psychiatric, and home health aid workers were women, as were 89.7% of all maids and
housekeeping cleaners. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Women’s Bureau, 20 Leading Occupations of Employed
Women 2004, http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/20lead2004.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
These jobs are among the lowest paying of all occupations; for example the median hourly wage for
personal care and service occupations is $8.59 an hour. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, November 2003 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates Personal Care
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first approach rather than training or education, few women gain the skills and
131
education needed to advance to better-paying jobs.
The emphasis on work
also makes it difficult for these women, most of whom are single parents, to
132
balance their dual roles of worker and parent.
The increased hours women
must work when on welfare (thirty), and when they leave welfare to obtain
sufficient monies for basic needs no longer covered by welfare, leaves less time
for caring for children.
An increased number of women who have left welfare are also in deep
133
poverty―their incomes are below one-half the poverty level.
A quarter or
more leavers have difficulty paying their bills and providing for basic needs,
134
such as food and housing. The decline in the economy over the last few years
has worsened the situation. Among the population of low-income single parent
135
households, most of which are headed by women, there has been a growth in
136
poverty and low incomes between 2000 and 2003.
Further, a substantial sub-population of welfare leavers is especially
vulnerable because they are no longer on welfare and are not working. About a
137
quarter of leavers fall into this category.
These women have multiple
disadvantages, both personal and logistical, that make work difficult. These
disadvantages include illness or disability, limited education and work
138
experience, and a lack of transportation and child care. The barriers faced by

and Service Occupations, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2003/november/oes_39pe.htm (last visited Feb.
4, 2005).
131. STRAWN, supra note 129, at 1 (noting that that women with an associates degree earn twice
as much as those with a high school diploma); Wavelet & Anderson, supra note 129, 56-7 (noting that
a college education is increasingly needed to obtain a better paying job). Federal law limits
vocational training to one year, which precludes college and many other long-term training
programs, and also limits the percentage of recipients who can participate in such programs. Many
women need more than a year to complete remedial classes and occupational certificate programs.
STRAWN, supra note 129, at 2.
132. IRV GARFINKEL & SARAH MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN (1988).
133. Ron Haskins, Reform, Family Income, and Poverty, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 103, 128
(Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001).
134. ACS & LOPREST, supra note 124, at 8.
135. 78% of single parent households are headed by women. TERRY LUGAILA & JULIA OVERTURF,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILDREN AND THE HOUSEHOLDS THEY LIVE IN: 2000 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-14.pdf.
136. See GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE URBAN INST., HOW HAVE HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN FARED
IN THE JOB MARKET DOWNTURN? 3 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
311163_A-67.pdf (finding an increase in poverty rates for single adult households from 34.6% to
37.7% between 2000 and 2003 with the share of low incomes increasing from 62.9% to 65.4%).
137. See LOPREST, supra note 124, at 14 (finding that about a quarter of leavers are not working
and do not have a working partner or spouse); LESLEY TURNER ET AL., UNIV. OF MICH., FAILING THE
TRANSITION FROM WELFARE TO WORK: WOMEN DISCONNECTED FROM WORK WELFARE, AND OTHER
SOURCES OF ECONOMIC SUPPORT (2004), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/research/
poverty/pdf/disconnected-april04.pdf (finding that approximately 25% of leavers are not working,
receiving cash assistance or other sources of economic support).
138. LOPREST, supra note 124, at 15 (finding that more than a quarter reported they were ill or
disabled, 12% reported problems with transportation or child care, and 15% reported that they were
unable to find a job); TURNER et al., supra note 137, at 6 (finding the following barriers among this
population: children with health problems, less than a high school education, few work skills, no car
or drivers’ license, reading scores at the fifth grade level or lower, and a learning disability).
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these nonworking leavers mirror those faced by the “hardest to serve” women
139
still on welfare. The sub-population of welfare leavers who are not working
also appears to be increasing. More recent data indicates that since the
downturn in the economy, the percentage of former leavers working has
140
decreased from fifty percent in 1999 to forty-two percent in 2002.
Many
141
leavers, about one-fifth, also return to welfare within a year.
The existence of these subgroups among the welfare population adds
another layer of complexity to the question of whether work mandates and
sanctions are necessary to improve the work behavior of poor, welfare-reliant
women. These subgroups of women, who face various disadvantages and
obstacles to work, are the most likely to be sanctioned. Sanctioned clients are
more likely to be under-educated, have less work experience, and have more
health, transportation and child care problems than clients who were not
sanctioned. The prevalence of these disadvantages and obstacles among
sanctioned women points to their inability to work rather than their
unwillingness to work. These barriers and characteristics are often overlooked
or discounted in the sanctioning process. Sanctions are also frequently applied
bluntly and swiftly based on a single infraction and without regard to past
efforts or willingness to work.
Applied in this manner, sanctions may discourage self-sufficiency rather
than encourage it. These sanctions can become an obstacle to work because of
the financial hardship they create. Additional services and support to overcome
these obstacles and disadvantages, rather than sanctions, are a more appropriate
142
response and are more likely to lead to self-sufficiency.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The evolution of welfare from an income assistance program to a workbased program was completed with the passage of PRWORA in 1996. Since that

139. See Sandra K. Danziger & Kristen S. Seefeldt, Barriers to Employment and the”Hard to Serve:”
Implications for Services, Sanctions and Time Limits, 22 FOCUS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 76-77 (2002), available at
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/poverty/pdf/foc221-part3-dadzinger.pdf#search=‘Barriers%20
to%20Employment%20and%20the%20â€œHard%20to%20Serveâ€―%20:%20Implications%20for%2
0Services’ (finding problems such as domestic violence, children with a health problem, mental
problems, no high school diploma, and transportation problems more prevalent among these hard
to serve welfare clients than women who have left the rolls and are working); Sheila R. Zedlewski &
Pamela Loprest, Will TANF Work for the Most Disadvantaged Families?, in THE NEW WORLD OF
WELFARE 311, 314, 319 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001) (finding multiple barriers among
recipients and nonworking leavers, including health problems, limited education, minimal work
experience and family responsibilities).
140. PAMELA LOPREST, THE URBAN INST., FEWER WELFARE LEAVERS EMPLOYED IN WEAK ECONOMY
1 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310837_snapshots3_no5.pdf#search=
‘FEWER%20WELFARE%20LEAVERS%20EMPLOYED%20IN%20WEAK%20ECONOMY’.
141. ACS & LOPREST, supra note 124, at 8.
142. States have, in part, recognized the need for additional support rather than sanctions. Some
states require clients to be contacted before they are sanctioned, and offered additional services and
support. Other states provide such support and services after a sanction is imposed to help clients
“cure” their sanctions and come into compliance with work rules. See LaDonna Pavetti & Dan
Bloom, State Sanctions and Time Limits, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 245, 252-4 (Rebecca Blank &
Ron Haskins eds., 2001), for a discussion of these various approaches.
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time, a multitude of factors, including upturns in the economy and policy
changes such as the EITC, along with welfare reform, have resulted in an
increased number of poor, formerly welfare-reliant, working women. While
some of these gains have diminished as the economy has faltered, there are still
fewer women on welfare and more women working than before the reforms.
However, many of these women are poorly paid and struggling to meet their
family’s basic needs despite their increased work efforts. This predicament
negates many of the purported gains associated with recent welfare reforms.
Policy-makers need to address these problems by enacting changes both
internal and external to the welfare system. Outside the welfare system, low
wages need to be supplemented and improved though such mechanisms as the
143
EITC and living wage laws. Within the welfare system, the emphasis should
be shifted from the current “work first” approach to an approach based on
training and education, which will lead to better-paying jobs. Additional
supports and incentives that facilitate and reward work, such as child care and
transportation are also crucial. These “carrots,” rather than the “sticks” of
sanctions, should be emphasized.
Welfare offices should also take measures to prevent the sanctioning of
families who are unable, rather than unwilling, to comply with “work first”
provisions. These measures should create better tools for assessing and
addressing barriers to work, so that these families are supported rather than
sanctioned. Further, welfare offices should more effectively weed out arbitrary
144
and inappropriate sanctions.
Welfare reform can only truly be judged a
success when support, rather than sanction, is its guiding philosophy, and when
the most disadvantaged women are not forced to endure punitive hardships on
their way to self-sufficiency.

143. See Jared Bernstein, The Living Wage Movement: Pointing the Way Toward the High Road,
VIEWPOINTS, July 17, 2000, available at http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/webfeatures_viewpoints_
lw_movement (discussing living wage laws, which attempt to increase the pay of low-income
workers above the poverty level).
144. The National Council on Disability suggests that these changes be made through federal
law. The Council proposes that the law be amended to prohibit the state from sanctioning a family
unless they take steps to identify barriers, provide the family with help in complying, and modify
the rules for disabled parents or children, so that the family can comply. The Council also suggests
that all states be required to have pre-sanction review procedures to avoid erroneous and
inappropriate sanctions. See generally, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TANF & DISABILITY:
IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTS FOR FAMILIES WITH DISABILITIES IN WELFARE REFORM (2003), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/familysupports.pdf#search=‘,%20IMPOR
TANCE%20OF%20SUPPORTS%20FOR%20FAMILIES%20WITH%20DISABILITIES%20IN%20WELF
ARE%20REFORM’.

